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Executive Secretariat

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NIO/FDIA
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The SDIO: A Security Threat to NRO Technology [REDACTED]

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I have been examining the counterintelligence and security issues involved in the protection of sensitive NRP technology. One of the first issues to surface with the NRO was the concern that key technologies, which they are developing and testing now for deployment near the end of the decade, will be compromised in the near-term as a result of the public debate on SDI by government officials insensitive to the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The NRO's principal concern is that early Soviet awareness of such plans could stimulate countermeasures development long before US deployment, thereby minimizing the effectiveness of the proposed programs.

[REDACTED]

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During the past 30 days I have interviewed NRO and Intelligence Community personnel involved with either technology development and/or intelligence support who are familiar with the SDIO. Their comments lead me to the following conclusions:

- The current security apparatus within the SDIO is not adequate to protect intelligence sources and methods. We have been told that there is no professional security officer there, the few officers assigned this duty have it as a secondary duty, and they are not familiar enough with security to be effective. Storage facilities for classified documents are inadequate and document control appears to be in disarray. [REDACTED]
- There appears to be a lack of appreciation among those involved with SDI, and especially those within the SDIO, about the high potential negative impact on future collection systems resulting from their disclosure of NRP-related technologies. It is clear that SDIO officers are trying to be responsive to the White House desire to sell the program but they are doing so with insufficient regard for the needs of the Intelligence Community. [REDACTED]
- Intelligence support to the SDIO is uneven at best, stemming from the organizational placement of the few qualified personnel within that office who could assure a continuous flow of intelligence and assist in its interpretation. Better intelligence support could stem the volume of inadvertent disclosures. [REDACTED]

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Some potential improvements:

- Strengthen the CIA (DI and DS&T) intelligence support to SDIO. [REDACTED]

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-- Offering a security support team to the SDIO. This team could serve as a permanent security element similar in concept to the one that has served so effectively for the NRO over the years. An alternative would be to loan such a team for 2-3 years until SDIO personnel are adequately trained and indoctrinated. [REDACTED]

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-- Offering an Office of Security inspection of the SDIO facility, including its procedures for transport, storage and general protection of classified Community documents. This would be a one time effort to establish a security baseline and to identify areas for improvement. [REDACTED]

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-- A security awareness program for SDIO, the NRO, and other appropriate elements in order to inform them of the damage to future collection programs resulting from the disclosure today of NRP programs. Briefings could be provided on the record of Soviet response to compromise and other disclosure. [REDACTED]

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